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On Appellee's motion, the Court of Appeals on December 4,
1990 ordered that the Resolution Trust Corporation,
conservator of newly chartered Home Savings Bank,

as

F.S.B.,

substituted as Appellee in place of Home Savings & Loan.
App.

P. 38(b).

be

Utah R,

For reasons of consistency, Appellee will be

referred to in this Brief as "Home"; as does Aetna in its

Petition and as the Court of Appeals did in its Decision.
QUESTIONS

PRESENTED

FOR

REVIEW

The two issues as to which Aetna seeks certiorari may be
framed

1.

as

follows:

Does the definition of "discovery," as set forth in a

"notice" rider to a now outdated bond form, warrant

re-examination by the Supreme Court of the issue of "coverage";
where the Court of Appeals' holding is based on language in the
"preamble" of the Aetna Bond, which no longer appears in the

standard bond now used by the surety industry for financial
institutions?

2.

Under the facts of this case, does Aetna establish

sufficient basis for the Supreme Court to exercise its

supervisory power to re-examine the Court of Appeals' and Trial
Court's construction of Section
OPINION

OF

THE

The Utah Court of Appeals,
Judgment entered November 2,

11

of Aetna's

COURT

OF

bond?

APPEALS

on August 6, 1991,

1988 in Home's favor.

affirmed the

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider Aetna's

petition.
1991).

Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2-2(5)(1953)(as amended 1989, Supp.

Home's Brief opposing Aetna's petition is timely filed,

within an extension of time granted by the Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING

PROVISIONS

As Aetna concedes, "No provisions of the Utah Constitution,
Utah Code Annotated,
the

issues

or other regulations are determinative of

in this case."
STATEMENT

I.

Nature

of

the

OF

THE

CASE

Case.

Home seeks indemnification for losses caused by the
dishonest conduct of one of its employees, Larry Glad, which it
sustained and discovered during the period a Savings & Loan
Blanket Bond issued by Aetna was in effect.

Home's losses arose

when the United States District Court, D. Utah,

in Armitage v.

Home Savings & Loan, Civil No. C82-0670K (Kane, J.) voided the
notes and trust deeds of 36 husband and wife borrowers who had

borrowed from Home to invest in AFCO, a Utah corporate enterprise
headed by Grant Affleck.

The Armitage jury returned a verdict

adverse to Home on August 14, 1984.

Following the jury's

verdict,, Home wrote off the loans in the latter part of 1984.

(Trial Exh. 220).

Subsequently, the Armitage Court, on February

24, 1986, entered judgment formally voiding the borrowers' notes
and trust deeds.

The principal on the 36 notes voided by the

Armitage Court totaled approximately $1.2 million,
in a net loss to Home of approximately $998,000.

which resulted

II-

Procedural History and Trial Court Disposition.

This action was tried to a jury over a five-week period in
October - November 1987.

Murphy)

The Trial Court (Hon. Michael R.

entered judgment in Home's favor on November 2, 1988.

Prior to trial, Aetna moved for summary judgment, contending
that judgment should be entered in Aetna's favor because Home,
allegedly, had "discovered its loss" before the Aetna Bond went
into effect on June 21, 1982 (though the Armitage verdict was not

returned until more than two years later,
entered eighteen months after that).
a determination that,
agreements,

and judgment formally

Simultaneously, Home sought

consistent with the bond's insuring

Home both "sustained" and thus "discovered" its loss

on the AFCO-investor loans during the time the Aetna Bond was in

effect.

The Trial Court denied Aetna's motion for summary

judgment and issued a separate Order construing the Bond,
which

it

in

ruled:

that plaintiff sustained a "loss," as the term "loss"
is contemplated in the Aetna Bond, on August 14, 1984.
Accordingly, plaintiff discovered its "loss sustained"
during the period the Aetna bond was in effect.
Sept.

21, 1987 Order (R. 385)

see Ct. App.

Decis.,

(copy attached at Appendix,

Tab 1) ;

p. 6.

At trial, Aetna asserted: that Home had not proven that Glad

was dishonest; that Home's losses were caused by Home's
mismanagement, not by Glad; that Home had failed to timely notify
Aetna of a covered loss or potential loss; that Section 11

excluded coverage; and that its Bond was void ab initio because
of failure to disclose information material to the risk being
insured.

Because Aetna failed to prove any prejudice,

the Trial

Court disposed of Aetna's "timely notice" defense in instructing

the jury.

Aetna, as the Court of Appeals noted, did not appeal

the Trial Court's ruling on "notice."

Ct. App. Decis., p. 17.

The jury found that Glad's conduct was dishonest; and that Glad's
conduct caused Home's losses in connection with 34 of the 36

loans that the jury reviewed.

The jury also found that Home did

not learn of Glad's dishonest conduct in connection with the

AFCO-investor loans until after the effective of the Aetna Bond.
Following trial, Aetna filed a JNOV motion in which it

contended, in contrast to the position it now takes in its
Petition, that the evidence at trial did not establish that Glad
was dishonest; or that Glad's misconduct caused Home's losses.

The Court denied Aetna's motion.

Judge Murphy also rejected

Aetna's "Section 11" defense, in considering the jury's responses
to special interrogatories.

Additional hearings ensued, which

involved matters extraneous to Aetna's present Petition.
Judgment was entered November 2, 1988.

Aetna appealed, asserting nine grounds alleged to constitute
error.

The parties filed extensive briefs and the issues were

argued in November, 1990.

On August 21, 1991, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the judgment.

Judge Greenwood wrote for the

majority, joined by Judge Billings.
III-

Statement

of

Judge Bench dissented.

Facts.

Home highlights the following distinctions to the "Statement
of Facts"

in Aetna's Petition.1

1 A more detailed exposition of pertinent facts may be
found in Home's Statement of Facts in its Brief to the Court
of Appeals, at pp. 10-26. See Tab 2, hereto.

1.

Aetna issued a then standard Form 22 Savings & Loan

Blanket Bond to Home, effective June 21, 1982.
was through F&D of Maryland.
2.
App.

Decis.,

Aetna solicited Home's business,

Decis.,

3.

Ct. App.

Prior coverage
p.4.

not vice versa.

Ct.

p. 4 & 30 n. 23.

Initially, Home applied for the same amount of coverage

it had with F&D.

Federal examiners, during the course of a

routine examination, directed Home to increase its coverage from
$900,000 to $1,135,000, consistent with regulatory formulas.
Appellee's Brief to Ct. Appeals,
4.

p. 11.

Alcorn v. Affleck was filed in U.S.

Bankruptcy Court in

April 1982 by several hundred disgruntled AFCO investors against
68 named defendants,
institutions.

a.
causes

including Home and 16 other financial

Aetna's

Statement omits that:

The Alcorn complaint (Trial Exh.
of action common to all

17

financial

358)

asserted

institutions and

was not directed exclusively to Home or its employees.
b.

The Complaint did not allege that any of Home's

employees had engaged in any specific dishonest conduct;
though it did assert a fraud claim (as well as 22 other
causes of action)

c.

common to the 68 defendants.

Notwithstanding the Alcorn complaint, Home

believed that

its

trust

deeds

were enforceable

because

it

had prepared a document for each borrower to sign,

acknowledging his/her sole responsibility to repay his/her
note.

See Ct. App.
d.

Decis.,

p. 3.

Aetna did not ask Home to disclose pending

lawsuits in the application it instructed Home to complete.

Ct. App.

e.

Decis., p. 28 & 30, n. 25.

After Home in December, 1982 notified Aetna of a

potential loss possibly covered by the bond, Aetna retained

Suitter & Axland to monitor the Armitage litigation, to

review pleadings, sit in on depositions, etc.
Order, R. 726).

(Pre-Trial

On September 30, 1983, having had the

benefit of monitoring the Armitage lawsuit and having
reviewed the very same pre-June 21, 1982 pleadings that it
now emphasizes in its Petition, Aetna advised Home in

writing that the pleadings did not set forth any claims that
would be covered under its Bond and opted not to defend
Home.

5.

See Ct. App. Decis., p. 22 n. 15; Trial Exh. 140.

As Aetna states, Home, prior to June 21, 1982, had

learned of a dishonest act by employee Larry Glad.

Aetna fails

to mention, however, that the jury found that the dishonest act
about which Home had learned was "not related to the AFCO

investor loans," Jury Ans. to Special Interrog. No. 7; and that
Home immediately terminated Glad after it learned of that

particular dishonest act.
6.

See Ct. App. Decis., p. 2-3.

The jury concluded that any failure by Home to disclose

material information in connection with the application for

insurance it completed was not intentional.

Jury Ans. to Special

Interrogatories Nos. 1-4; Ct. App. Decis., p. 6, 27.2
7.

Contrary to the innuendo in Aetna's petition, Home has

always maintained that it discovered Larry Glad's dishonest

2 Aetna does not seek review of the Court of Appeals'
rejection of its misrepresentation defense. See Ct. App.
Decis., p. 26-30.

conduct, vis-a-vis the AFCO-investor loans, in the Fall of 1982,
in the course of discovery in Armitage and, thus, after Aetna's
bond went into effect in June,
Appeals, p. 26.

1982.

The jury agreed,

See Appellee's Brief to Ct.

finding that Home did not learn

of dishonest conduct by Glad in connection with the AFCO-investor
loans prior to June 21, 1982.
7; Ct. App. Decis.,
IV.

Jury Ans. to Spec.

Interrog. No.

p. 6, 17.

Governing Contract Provisions.
The Bond at

issue

is now an outdated Standard Form No.

22

"Savings & Loan Blanket Bond" (1970 revised version), as amended
by the thirteen "riders" designated in the Bond's cover sheet ana

appended to the Bond.

(Trial Exh. 343).

Coverage for fidelity

losses is governed by the introductory paragraph of the insuring
agreements, which the Court of Appeals labeled "the Preamble,"

Ct. App. Decis., p. 15, and by Rider 6041.

Section 11, paragraph

3, of the Bond terminates coverage as to a particular employee
once an employer learns of dishonest conduct by the employee.

Section 4 of the Bond defines the Insured's duty to provide
notice.

Rider 6091 specifically amends Section 4, and clarifies

that the Insured is expected to give notice, not only once a
covered loss has been sustained, but also "when the Insured

becomes aware of facts which would cause a reasonable person to
assume that a loss covered by the bond . . . will be incurred
even though the exact amount . . . of loss may not be then

known."

The Court of Appeals held that Rider 6091 governs only

the Insured's duty to provide timely notice and concluded that it
does

not

bear on whether

a

loss

that

results

conduct is or is not covered by the Bond.

from dishonest

Ct. App.

Decis.,

p.i^-

26.

According to the Court of Appeals, Rider 6091 does not

govern the outcome of any issues on appeal.

Furthermore, the form of bond which Aetna asks the Supreme
Court to again interpret is one that is no longer used by
sureties or financial institutions, having been displaced in 1986
by the significantly revised Form 24 "Financial Institution

Bond."3

In particular, the introductory insuring agreement

language (the "Preamble")

found in the 1970 Form 22 S&L Aetna

Bond, on which the Court of Appeals and Trial Court based their

holding, does not appear in the new Financial Institution Bond.
ARGUMENT

I.

Aetna fails to establish any "special or important" reason
why the Supreme Court

should re-examine the Court of

Appeals' holding regarding coverage.
The first question presented by Aetna's Petition concerns

the scope of coverage provided by Aetna's promise to indemnify
Home for "loss sustained by the Insured at any time but

3 In 1986, the surety industry approved for use the
Form 24 Financial Institution Bond (Revised January, 1986).
The Financial Institution Bond displaces former versions of
the Form 24 Bankers Blanket Bond and the Form 22

S&L Blanket

Bond.
Harvey C. Koch, "Overview of Major Developments and
Changes During the Last Decade in Financial Institution
Bonds," Financial Institution Bonds (ABA, Tort & Insurance

Practice Section; Eds. Koch & Rouse; 1989) (Symposium,
Washington, D.C., April 17-18, 1989) (attached at Tab 3).

A

specimen of the standard Form 24 Financial Institution Bond
(revised to January, 1986) is attached hereto at Tab 4. The
Financial Institution Bond replaces the Form 22 S & L
Blanket Bond (as revised Dec. 1982), a specimen of which is
attached at Tab 5, which differs significantly from the 1970

version it replaced.

Also attached for comparison purposes,

at Tab 6, is a specimen of the Form 24 Bankers Blanket Bond
(revised to July, 1980).
At Tab 7 is a specimen of the Form
24 Bankers Blanket Bond (revised to April, 1969) (which is
similar to the Form 22 S&L Bond at issue).
Home asks that
the Court take judicial notice of the different, standard
versions

attached hereto.

discovered during the Bond Period."

Insuring Agreements.4

Aetna Bond,

"Preamble" to

Section 4 of the Aetna Bond provides that

written notice must be provided to Aetna "at the earliest

practicable moment after discovery of any loss hereunder ..."
Rider 6091 specifically amends Section 4, and provides that:
Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of
facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume
that a loss covered by the bond has been or will be

incurred even though the exact amount or details of
loss may not be then known.

Notice to the insured of

an actual or potential claim by a third party which
alleges that the Insured is liable under circumstances,
which, if true, would create a loss under this bond
constitutes such discovery.

The Court of Appeals concluded that this definition of discovery

in Rider 6091 applied only to the term "discovery" as used in the
Notice Provision and not to the term "discovery" as used in the
Preamble to the Insuring Agreements.
on several factors in this regard:

The Court of Appeals relied
(i) the phrase "discovered

during the Bond Period," as it appears in the Preamble, expressly
refers to "loss sustained," not dishonest employee conduct;

(ii)

the above definition of discovery was added by an endorsement,
the stated purpose of which was to "amend" only the Notice
Provision (namely, Section 4 of the Bond);
includes a

"Definitions"

section that

(iii) the Bond

includes numerous

definitions that "apply throughout the bond" and Aetna did not
include the definition of "discovery" in the general Definitions
section; and (iv) different definitions of "discovery" for notice

4

In the entire breadth of its Petition, Aetna only

once mentions "the preamble" to its Bond (which governs
coverage generally) and never mentions Rider 6041 (the
fidelity insuring agreement).
It is these express
provisions on which the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court
based their holdings.
See Ct. App. Decis., p. 15-16.

purposes and coverage purposes "does not cause disharmony of the

bond language [given] the different purposes those provisions are
intended to serve."

See Ct. App. Decis., p. 24-26.

This Court should decline to review the coverage issue for
several reasons.

First, the coverage question is extremely

unlikely to recur in subsequent litigation, and is thus not a

"special and important" question worthy of discretionary review.
Second, the dire consequences predicted by Aetna are not likely
to occur.

Third, the Court of Appeals correctly construed the

coverage provisions of the Bond.

Finally, the Alcorn complaint

did not warrant entry of summary judgment in Aetna's favor.
A.

This issue is extremely unlikely to be presented in
subsequent litigation.

The standard bond form at issue here was revised in 1982 to

move the contents of Rider 6091 into the body of the bond form.

That 1982 revision made three changes to the discovery definition
that are relevant to this Court's determination as to whether

this case warrants discretionary review.

First, the Surety

Association of America, which issues the standard bond form,
removed the definition of discovery from the Notice Provision and

placed it in an entirely separate and independent section of the
bond.

See Standard Form No.

22, Revised to December 1982,

Section 4 (attached hereto as Tab 5).

Second, the Surety

Association added the following as the first sentence in the new

discovery provision:

"This bond applies to loss discovered by

the Insured during the bond period."

Third, the Surety

Association deleted the language in the Preamble to the Insuring
Clauses that had granted coverage for "loss sustained by the

10

Insured at any time but discovered during the Bond Period."
Thus,

the 1982 and subsequent changes wholly undermine

Aetna's suggestion that this case qualifies for discretionary
review.

As previously stated, the question presented by the

language at issue here is extremely unlikely to recur since that
language was revised by the Surety Association, ostensibly to
resolve this ambiguity, almost ten years ago.

Second, the Court

of Appeals indicated that it likely would agree with Aetna's
coverage position under the new bond language, even though it

rejected Aetna's coverage position under the prior ambiguous
language.

See Ct. App. Decis. p. 23 ("This [new] language

clearly ties coverage to discovery of possible loss, because the
definition of discovery is given in the context of the bonds'
applicability, rather than in the context of notice

requirements").5
B.

The dire consequences that Aetna predicts as a
consequence of the the Court of Appeals'

Decision are

illusory.
Aetna vigorously complains that the decision of the Court of
Appeals will "uniquely prejudice Utah financial institutions and

their depositors," and will create "uncertainty and confusion"
for financial institutions in Utah.
groundless.

This complaint is totally

As a result of the 1982 and 1986 revisions to the

standard bond form, the decision of the Court of Appeals —
if it is incorrect —

even

will have no practical precedential impact

5 In discerning that two of the cases on which Aetna
relied in its Reply Brief contained operative provisions not
in and different from those in the Aetna Bond, the Court of
Appeals stated that, "Royal Trust and Clay are instructive
as to how Aetna might have drafted its bond to obtain the
result

it

now

seeks."

11

on current bond coverage issues in this state.

In addition to its "uncertainty and confusion" argument,

Aetna predicts that the Court of Appeals' holding will "encourage

financial institutions to postpone reporting losses in the hopes
of buying higher limits for known problems."

This argument is

pure speculation, is contrary to the record, and of dubious
validity given the revisions in the standard bonds that have
transpired since the Aetna Bond was formulated in 1970.

As a

practical matter, possibility always exists with a "discovery"
bond that an insured may be tempted to manipulate the claim.
Affirmative defenses to such errant conduct include fraud or

misrepresentation, or that the insured has not timely notified
its insurer of actual or potential loss.
the Court.

Neither issue is before

The Court of Appeals' Decision in no way increases

incentive to hide knowledge of past employee misconduct, in order
to obtain higher coverage.

What it may do is encourage insurers

to ask about former employees in applications for fidelity bond
coverage,

see U.S.

Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

448 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir. 1971)

v.

Empire State Bank,

(which implicitly made this

same, unheeded, recommendation 20 years ago); or ask insureds to

disclose all pending lawsuits in applications for bond coverage
(as Aetna now does),

see Ct. App.

Decis., p. 30 n. 24.

Aetna belatedly argues that the Court of Appeals'

Decision

will leave Utah financial institutions without coverage, because
fidelity insurers will refuse to renew coverage once they receive
notice of potential loss.

Aetna Petition, p. 14.

As the Court

of Appeals noted at page 25 n. 17 of its Decision, Aetna never

raised this argument below and both the Court's Sept. 21, 1987
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Order and the facts stipulated to in the Pre-trial Order

establish that Home's loss was sustained following the jury's
verdict in 1984, within the bond period, when it then became
evident that Home would not be able to rely on the notes and
trust deeds that it had presumed to be enforceable.

This

particular argument, because it was never raised in the
approximately 5 year history of this case,

has not been briefed

and should not be considered for the first time on appeal.

If,

however, the express language in a bond is capable of being

interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the actual language
(Aetna's position); then the Insured is entitled to have the

ambiguity construed in favor of coverage.
Co. v. Morgan. Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner.

(Cal. App.

1978).

See Continental Ins.
14 8 Cal.

Rptr.

57, 66

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals'

construction was predicated on express language which appears in
the 1970 edition Form 22 Aetna S&L Blanket Bond, which is not
replicated in the new 1986 Financial Institution Bond or

in the

immediately prior 1982 version of the Form 22 S&L Blanket Bond.

Hence,

it is extremely unlikely that this case will produce the

adverse result that Aetna foretells.

Finally,

for an insurer to

require notice of potential loss, then suggest it would use that
notice as a basis to arbitrarily refuse renewal of a bond,

raises

serious question concerning the insurer's implied covenant to
deal in good faith.

C.

The Court of Appeals' holding on coverage is properly
based on the bond's insuring agreements.

The Court of Appeals properly began its analysis by
examining the express language of the bond.

13

As noted above, the

preamble to the insuring agreements in Aetna's bond states that

Aetna will "indemnify" "loss sustained by the Insured at any time
but discovered during the Bond period ..."

Historically,

because a fidelity bond is an "indemnity insurance contract,"
courts have held that "the insurer's liability does not arise
until the insured has suffered a proven loss."

American Empire

Ins. Co. of So. Dakota v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.. 408 F.2d
72, 77 (5th Cir. 1969); 13 Couch on Insurance § 46:219 at 163

(1982).

To successfully claim under a fidelity bond, an insured

must first prove it has sustained an actual loss; i.e., one
involving some sort of financial detriment.

Continental Cas. Co.

v. First National Bank of Temple. 116 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied 85 L.Ed. 1533

(1941).

The Preamble, as the Court of Appeals held, requires Aetna

to indemnify loss sustained at any time, but discovered during
the bond period.
noted,

Ct. App. Decis., p. 23-26.

As the Trial Court

in the usual fidelity loss context, the insured first

sustains a loss (e.g., through embezzlement), then later

ascertains that the loss was caused by employee dishonesty.

In

that situation, fidelity insurers freely agree to indemnify
actual loss incurred even during an earlier bond period, provided

the insured doesn't learn that the earlier loss was the product
of employee dishonesty until such time as the second bond is in
place.

This case addresses the more infrequent situation where the
insurer alleges that the insured discovered dishonest conduct

during a prior bond period, but the loss is not actually
sustained or discovered until later.
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Based on tne express

language of the Preamble in the Aetna Bond, the Court of Appeals
and Trial Court both rejected Aetna's assertion that Home's loss

(which had not yet been incurred) was somehow "discovered" during
and covered by an earlier bond.

As Aetna explained its position to the Court of Appeals,
"Loss refers to the awareness of conditions out of which a claim

may arise, not to the insured's adjudicated liability for that
loss."

It is this metaphysical definition of "loss" and

accompanying definition of "discovery of loss," that the Court of

Appeals rejected.

The Court of Appeals exercised great care to

distinguish the cases collected by Aetna, virtually all of which
focused on the issue of whether an insured had timely given
notice to the insurer of a pre-existing loss or future loss,

believed to be covered by the bond.

Ct. App. Decis., p. 17-24.6

The expectation that an insured should give notice as early

as possible, even before loss is actually sustained, has long

been recognized.7
however,

Prior to 1980, the duty to give notice,

was not clearly specified in the Form 22 Bond.

case of the standard Form 22 S&L Blanket Bond,

In the

for example, the

6 Aetna especially criticizes the Court's distinction
of Royal Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Ins.

Pittsburgh. 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986).
n. 6.

Co.

of

Petition, p. 13

As the Court of Appeals correctly noted,

the

operative language of the bond interpreted in Royal Trust
(which appears to have been a Form 24 Banker's Blanket Bond,
1980 revised ed.), differs markedly from that in the Form 22
S&L Bond (1970 revised ed.) with attached riders, which it
construed.
Ct. App. Dec, p. 23 & n. 16; compare Aetna Bond

to bond construed in Royal Trust, supra at 720.

7 Wildau, K.

"Evolving Law of Third-Party Claims Under

Fidelity Bonds: When is Third-Party Recovery Allowed?"
& Insurance Law J.

(Fall 1989),
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at 92,

113.

Tort

duty of an insured to give notice, prior to 19808 was defined
solely by Section 4, which directed that:

At the earliest practicable moment after discovery of
any loss hereunder the Insured shall give the
Underwriter notice thereof

.

.

.

Courts disagreed whether Section 4's "discovery of loss"
language required notice prior to the time the insured sustained
an actual loss covered by the Bond.
& Trust Co.

1963)

v. Aetna Cas.

& Sur.

Compare.

Co.,

Mount Vernon Bank

2 24 F.Supp.

666 (E.D. Va.

(requiring notice prior to realization of loss) and First

Security Bank of Utah v. Aetna Cas.

& Sur.

Co.,

Civil No. NC-74-

23W (Memorandum Decis. and Order, July 11, 1984)(Winder, J.)

(holding that insured's duty to give notice in a third-party
claim context arises only once the third-party claim causes loss

to the insured).9

Rider 6091, which expressly amended Section 4,

was intended simply to clarify that insurers also wished notice
when

"The Insured becomes

aware of

facts which would cause a

reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the bond has
been or will be incurred ..." (Emphasis added).

Finally, Utah law is well settled that if coverage
provisions in a policy of insurance are ambiguous (as they would
seem to be when an insurer insists that an insuring agreement
means something other than what it says), then the insured is
entitled to have the ambiguity construed in favor of coverage.

R Rider 6091, for attachment to Standard Forms nos. 5,
14, 20, and 22, was adopted effective December,
Aetna Bond, Rider 6091.

1980.

See

9 A copy of Judge Winder's Decision is attached hereto
at Tab 8.
Contrary to the implicit threat in Aetna's
current Petition, Aetna did not refuse to insure financial

institutions in Utah following Judge Winder's Opinion.
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LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah
1988);
at

see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, supra

66.

D.

The Alcorn complaint did not warrant entry of summary
judgment in Aetna's favor.

In its summary judgment motion, Aetna relied on various

alleged events, which it argued would prompt any reasonable
person,

prior to June 21,

1982, to conclude that a loss covered

by its Bond would be sustained.

Secondarily, it relied on notice

ostensibly provided by the Alcorn complaint and one or two other
similar actions.

The jury's finding that Glad's dishonest

conduct which Home discovered prior to June 1982 was not related

to the AFCO-investor loans, should preclude Aetna from rearguing
those facts yet again to this Court.

Still,

relying on Rider

6091, and interpreting Rider 6091 to define coverage, Aetna rails
that the Alcorn lawsuit (apparently apart from the jury's

finding) as a matter of law establishes coverage as falling
within the time period of the prior F&D Bond.
characterizes the

As Aetna

issue:

The Majority Opinion rejected Aetna's
reliance on a bright line test in a Rider to
the bond, which defines "discovery" in thirdparty claim situations as occurring no later
than the date on which Home is sued by a
third-party alleging any employee dishonesty.
(Aetna Petition, p. 3).
Assuming arguendo that Rider 6091 redefines the Bond's insuring
provisions, Aetna conveniently forgets that on September 30,
1983, after studying the Alcorn and other complaints,

it advised

Home that the pleadings did not assert any causes of action that,
if established, would be covered under the Bond.

17

The Court of

Appeals noted the inconsistency of Aetna's position, concluding
that, "In effect, Aetna asserted that Home had not discovered any
employee dishonesty at a time when the Aetna bond had been in

force for over one year."

Ct. App. Decis., p. 22 n. 15.

Having

itself concluded that the Alcorn complaint failed to state
allegations which,
bond,

if true, would establish a loss under the

Aetna cannot very well ask this Court to exercise its

supervisory/correction powers to now avoid the jury verdict and
judgment entered by the Trial Court and, instead, direct that
summary judgment be entered in Aetna's favor.

II.

Aetna does not establish sufficient reason for the Supreme
Court to re-examine the Court of Appeals1
Section

construction of

11.

Section 11 of the Aetna Bond provides that when an insured

discovers that one of its employees has engaged in dishonest
conduct,

[that]

the bond "shall be deemed terminated or canceled as to

Employee."

Its purpose is to shift the risk of loss

arising from future misconduct to the insured, once the insured
learns of dishonesty but nevertheless elects to retain the
employee.

Ct.

App.

Decis.,

p. 9.

this case, the Court of Appeals,

In the context of the facts of

Decis., p. 14, held:

that coverage for losses caused by Glad's
dishonest conduct, where that conduct
occurred

before Home

learned that he was

dishonest, and where the coverage for such
losses would have continued under renewal of

the F&D bond,
of

the

Aetna

is not barred by section eleven
bond.

In asking this Court to exercise its supervisory function,
Aetna asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored "universal" and
"clear precedent" contrary to its decision.

That "clear

precedent" consists of a single case,10 decided over a dissenting
opinion.

In a detailed analysis, the Court of Appeals declined

to embrace the majority's holding in Wilson.

The Court

distinguished most of the other cases Aetna again cites in its
Petition," noting that each involved the situation where an
employer hires an employee, knowing of past dishonest conduct;
and concluding that it is proper in such instance to deny
coverage for loss arising out of similar subsequent conduct.

The

jury's finding that Home did not know of any dishonest conduct by
Glad prior to hiring him, however, renders these cases

inapposite.

Jury Ans. to Spec. Interrog. No. 6.

Aetna argues in its Petition that Section 11 "properly
leaves" coverage with the insurer in whose bond period the
dishonesty was first discovered and that Home would have

perfected whatever coverage it had with F&D through timely
notice.

First, this argument and explanation differs from the

interpretation Aetna initially requested below (which was that on
discovery of dishonest conduct all coverage for future losses is
terminated (even if F&D was still the insurer)).
Brief to Ct. Appeals, p. 31, 33.

Second,

See Aetna's

it fails because the

dishonest conduct about which Home had learned prior to June 21,
1982 was,

as the jury found,

not related to the AFCO-investor

10 C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of No.
America, 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
831,

100

S.

Ct.

59.

11 Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426
F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970); Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas
Co.,

219 So.2d 508,

(La.

1969);

St.

Joe Paper Co.

v.

Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 359 F.2d 579, (5th Cir.
1966); cases discussed at Ct. App. Decis., p. 9.
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loans; thus notice to F&D of conduct that did not result in the

loss that Home later sustained would have perfected nothing.

Third, as the Court of Appeals held, Section 11 is ambiguous in
the situation where successive insurers are involved, and, for
the reasons explained by the Court,

is "susceptible to the

interpretation that it does not bar the continuation of the same

fidelity loss coverage under the Aetna bond that existed under

the F&D bond."

Ct. App. Decis., p. 14.

The holding by the Court

of Appeals, which affirmed the Trial Court's ruling below, is
based on a textual reading of Section 11 as well as consideration

of its purpose and objective, and relies on accepted rules of
construction where ambiguity exists.

As such, this is not a

situation where supervisory correction, pursuant to Rule 46(c),
is warranted.
CONCLUSION

Based on the above argument and authorities, Home requests
that the Supreme Court deny Aetna's petition for writ of
certiorari.

DATED this

day of November, 1991.
CALLISTER,
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